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Abstract 
Verbal interaction is one of the most frequent social interactions humans encounter on a daily
basis. In the current paper, we zoom in on what the multi-brain approach has contributed, and
can contribute in the future, to our understanding of the neural mechanisms supporting verbal
interaction.  Indeed,  since  verbal  interaction  can  only  exist  between  individuals,  it  seems
intuitive  to  focus  analyses  on  inter-individual  neural  markers,  i.e.  between-brain  neural
coupling. To date, however, there is a severe lack of theoretically-driven, testable hypotheses
about  what  between-brain  neural  coupling  actually  reflects.  In  this  paper,  we  develop  a
testable hypothesis in which between-pair variation in between-brain neural coupling is of key
importance. Based on theoretical frameworks and empirical data, we argue that the level of
between-brain  neural  coupling  reflects  speaker-listener  alignment  at  different  levels  of
linguistic  and extra-linguistic representation. We discuss the possibility that between-brain
neural coupling could inform us about the highest level of inter-speaker alignment: mutual
understanding. 
Keywords 
Hyperscanning; social neuroscience; verbal communication; mutual understanding; alignment
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1. Introduction
Recent advances in the field of social neuroscience suggest that in order to get at a complete
understanding of the different neural processes involved in social interaction, the dynamic
interplay between the brains of two interacting individuals needs to be studied (e.g. Hari et al.,
2015; Hasson et al., 2012).  The inter-individual neural markers of interest are inter-subject
correlations in temporal and spatial patterns of brain activity, also known as  between-brain
neural coupling (Stephens et al., 2010). Assessing the level of between-brain neural coupling
requires  measuring  brain  activity  for  two  (or  more)  participants  involved  in  a  social
interaction,  a  technique  called  hyperscanning  (brain  activation  is  measured  for  both
participants at  the same time) or pseudo-hyperscanning (measuring brain activity for both
participants  in  the  interaction,  but  sequentially,  one  participant  at  a  time).  Since  the  first
application of the hyperscanning method in fMRI (Montague et al., 2002), it has been applied
to  other  neuroimaging methods as  well  (EEG, fNIRS and MEG) and used to  investigate
different aspects of social interaction (for overviews see Babiloni and Astolfi, 2014; Dumas et
al., 2011; Konvalinka and Roepstorff, 2012).  
In the current paper, we zoom in on what the multi-brain approach has contributed,
and can contribute in the future, to our understanding of verbal interaction. Given the fact that
verbal interaction is ubiquitous in our everyday lives, it is surprising that relatively few multi-
brain studies have focused on this specific form of social interaction. So far, most multi-brain
verbal communication studies have used the hyperscanning method to investigate the spatial
and temporal relationship between neural mechanisms which support language production by
the speaker and comprehension by the listener (see section 2). Although these studies claim to
investigate  the neural correlates of verbal information transfer,  they generally ignore pair-
specific information about the quality of the interaction: whether information transfer was
actually successful. However, it has been previously suggested that successful communication
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or mutual understanding can be operationalized in the form of inter-subject correlations in
brain activity (Menenti et al., 2012; Stephens et al., 2010). We argue that the reason this idea
has not been investigated in more detail is that although intuitive, it is not backed up by a
strong theoretical framework leading to testable hypotheses. 
We will  discuss  a  recent  theoretical  framework  (Friston  and Frith,  2015a;  2015b)
leading to the testable hypothesis that the strength of between-brain neural coupling reflects
speaker-listener alignment at  multiple  representational  levels (section 3).  In  section 4,  we
consider  the  possibility  that  between-brain  neural  coupling could reflect  alignment  at  the
highest  representational  level  possible:  the  level  of  the  situation  model.  If  so,  this  would
provide us with an inter-personal marker of successful communication. We discuss several
possibilities to test this hypothesis before concluding this paper with an outlook on how the
hyperscanning method may be used in future research.  
2. A multi-brain approach to studying the relationship between language comprehension
and production 
There have been a few studies that have investigated speaker-listener neural coupling during
verbal communication (Dikker et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2012; Kuhlen et al., 2012; Silbert et
al.,  2014;  Stephens  et  al.,  2010).  Like  two-brain  studies  on  non-verbal  communication
(Anders et al., 2011; Ménoret et al., 2014; Schippers et al., 2010), most of these studies have
used the multi-brain approach to investigate ‘information flow’ from the brain of the sender
(the speaker) to the brain of the receiver (the listener). In other words, to what extent is neural
activity  associated  with  encoding  of  information  by  the  sender  mirrored  in  the  activity
associated with the decoding of that information by the receiver? The reasoning here is as
follows: if activity in area X in the brain of the sender is temporally correlated with activity in
area  X  in  the  brain  of  the  listener  (perhaps  with  a  delay),  this  indicates  that  area  X  is
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associated with encoding as well as decoding of information. More specifically, for verbal
communication,  such a finding would indicate that the neural infrastructures for language
production  and comprehension  at  least  in  part  overlap,  opposing the  classical  Wernicke-
Lichtheim-Geschwind  model,  in  which  a  strict  division  of  labor  is  proposed.  However,
speaker-listener correlations in brain activity would be in line with converging evidence from
patient data (e.g. Caramazza and Zurif, 1976) and one-brain neuroimaging studies (Menenti et
al.,  2011;  Segaert  et  al.,  2012),  which support the view that  the  same brain regions may
support language production as well as comprehension. 
In  the  first  two-brain  study  on  verbal  communication,  Stephens  and  colleagues
(Stephens et al., 2010) recorded a speaker telling an unrehearsed real-life story and played this
recording to eleven listeners. Crucially, brain activity was measured with fMRI for both the
speaker and listeners. By modeling the expected activity in the listeners' brains based on the
speaker's neural activity during speech production, Stephens et al. tested whether the neural
activity  of the speaker was temporally  and spatially  coupled to  the shared neural activity
observed across all listeners. In other words, they tested whether there was overlap in brain
areas involved in producing and listening to speech, and whether these activation patterns in
the  speaker  and listener's  brains  were  temporally  related  to  each  other  (e.g.  whether  the
speaker's brain activity preceded the listener's brain activity). Indeed, Stephens et al. found
widespread spatial coupling between brain activity in the speaker and listener, both in areas
classically associated with language processing (such as the left superior temporal gyrus and
the  left  inferior  frontal  gyrus),  and  in  areas  that  support  processes  that  are  generally
considered to be extra-linguistic (such as the precuneus and the medial prefrontal  cortex).
Temporally, for most (but not all) of these areas within the listeners' brains, activity lagged
behind the speaker's brain by three to six seconds. Crucially, the spatial and temporal coupling
that was found when the speaker and listeners processed the same story largely disappeared
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when listeners were listening to a Russian speaker, or when the brain activity of the speaker
that was used to model the listeners' neural responses was associated with the speaker telling a
different story than the story the listeners were listening to. This indicates that between-brain
neural coupling does not only depend on producing and hearing the same acoustic signal, but
also on the extent to which the signal can be decoded by the listener. If the listener cannot
process  the  linguistic  input  to  extract  meaning  and  structure,  the  underlying  linguistic
processes do not match and there will thus not be any coupling in areas necessary for these
processes.  
Other fMRI studies in which the two-brain approach has been applied to similar verbal
information transfer paradigms report similar results (Silbert et al., 2014; Spiegelhalder et al.,
2014). In general, these studies report enhanced between-brain neural coupling during one-
way communication; when producing or listening to the same verbal information stimulus, the
brain activity of the speaker is reflected in the brain of the listener. Together, these studies
provide a novel type of evidence in favor of the hypothesis that language production and
comprehension depend (at least in part) on the same neural mechanisms. This information is
crucial for theories trying to explain behavioral phenomena in dialogue which require close
coupling  between  language  production  and  comprehension  processes  and/or  shared
representations  at  different  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  levels  (see  also:  Pickering  and
Garrod,  2014).  One  example  of  such  a  behavioral  phenomenon  in  dialogue  is  syntactic
priming: hearing a specific sentence structure increases the chance that speakers will use this
structure  in  a  subsequent  utterance.  For  this  type  of  behavioral  priming  to  occur  from
comprehension to production, one must assume some degree of shared representation and/or
processing at the level of sentence structure (Menenti et al., 2012). 
Most multi-brain verbal interaction studies have thus used speaker-listener between-
brain neural coupling to identify neural networks associated with language production as well
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as language comprehension. These results have been taken as evidence to support theories
which propose that a certain degree of overlap in the neural networks underlying language
production and comprehension is necessary to explain inter-personal behavioral phenomena
in natural conversation,  such as priming. However,  we would also like to  make a critical
observation here. By focusing research on identifying brain networks required for language
production and comprehension, most of the studies discussed above have reported between-
brain neural coupling common for all interaction pairs in their sample. Indeed, by comparing
inter-subject correlations in pairs that produce and understand the same communicative signal
to the correlations in pairs who are not coupled in this way, one can extract brain areas that are
necessary to produce the signal on the one hand, and comprehend it on the other. However, by
focusing on  what  is  present  across  all  pairs,  we lose  pair-specific  information  about  the
quality of the interaction,  which may vary from pair to pair.  In  the next section,  we will
discuss what between-pair variation in speaker-listener neural coupling could tell us about the
quality of verbal interaction. 
3.  Between-brain neural coupling as a measure of speaker-listener alignment
So far, we have discussed results of two-brain studies using verbal communication paradigms 
that have looked at between-brain neural coupling at the group level, identifying brain areas 
that  show  reliable  inter-subject  correlations  across  all  real  communication  pairs.  In  this 
section,  we will instead focus on variations in the level of between-brain neural  coupling 
between  different  sets  of  communication  pairs.  More  specifically,  we  hypothesize  that 
between-pair differences in the extent of between-brain neural coupling may be explained by 
the level of alignment between speaker and listener at multiple levels of linguistic and extra-
linguistic representations.  
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Our hypothesis is largely based on a recent theoretical framework proposed by Friston
and Frith (Friston and Frith, 2015a; Friston and Frith, 2015b). As an extension of the more
general predictive coding framework, Friston and Frith consider communication in terms of
inferences about others. Indeed, predictive coding theory assumes that our brain infers the
causes of sensory input to be able to correctly predict upcoming input. The predictive coding
framework fits  within  a  shift  in  cognitive  neuroscience  away from seeing the  brain  as  a
passive filter of information and towards a view of the brain as an active organ that generates
predictions  about  upcoming  sensory  input.  These  top-down  predictions  are  compared  to
representations at lower levels of the hierarchy to form a prediction error: a bottom-up signal
reflecting the mismatch between prediction and actual sensory input. Prediction errors can be
seen as feedback signals that ensure that the internal or generative model is updated, so that
predictions are adapted and prediction errors for future incoming input are minimized. 
In  the  predictive  coding  framework,  the  main  goal  of  the  brain  is  to  minimize
prediction  error.  According  to  Friston  and  Frith,  prediction  error  for  the  listener  in  a
communicative context would be minimized if they converge on a similar or identical internal
or generative model as their partner. Put differently, alignment of these internal models would
lead to successful predictions for the listener and thus facilitated communication. Crucially,
Friston and Frith suggest that when the listener can correctly predict what the speaker will say
next, their neural states will show what they call  generalized synchrony. Friston and Frith
explain generalized synchrony as knowing the neural state of one brain in a pair by knowing
the neural state of the other brain in that pair. Indeed, this is very similar to the definition of
between-brain neural coupling that we have used above: inter-subject correlations in brain
activity. 
But  how  is  it  that  correctly  predicting  what  the  speaker  says  leads  to  coupling
(generalized synchrony) between brain activity of speaker and listener? This would only be
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possible if speaking and listening are both driven by the same underlying processes. Indeed, 
this is what is proposed in the predictive coding framework: the predictions that are generated 
by any individual cannot only be tested against external input; they can also be enacted. 
According to Friston and Frith, action and perception (language production and 
comprehension) are two sides of the same coin. The predictions generated are amodal in 
nature and not specific for comprehension or production only. Therefore, when the listener 
has correctly inferred the speaker's generative model, their predictions will be similar, which 
is in turn reflected in generalized synchrony or between-brain neural coupling.  
 Generalized synchrony is a ubiquitous phenomenon in loosely coupled dynamical 
systems. In the context of communication and predictive coding, it attains a special 
status. This is because communication in the sense of aligning internal representations (i.e., a 
dialogue) requires turn taking and the reciprocal augmentation and attenuation of expressive 
versus receptive processes.  If I can use my same predictive machinery to predict (and 
confirm) what I am listening to, as well as to provide motor predictions that allow me to 
articulate a narrative, then if we are in true alignment and are ‘on the same page’, then it does 
not matter whether you or I are speaking – because we should be hearing the same thing. This 
form of generalized synchrony can be regarded as the dynamical homologue of alignment in 
communication, which rests upon an amodal representation of a narrative (that can be used for 
speaking or listening respectively).
This account of communication thus provides us with a theoretical backdrop about the 
mechanisms that lead to between-brain neural coupling. Furthermore, it makes a specific 
causal prediction: the extent to which brain activity of speaker and listener are coupled should 
be modulated by the extent to which the listener has correctly inferred the generative model of 
the speaker, and thus can predict upcoming input. Between-brain neural coupling can 
therefore be operationalized as a measure of alignment of the speaker and listener's generative
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models. However, what remains unclear is what would be represented in such a dynamic 
generative model, and at what level predictions are made. Based on behavioral research, 
others have proposed that for a hierarchical system like language, interlocutors align at many 
different representational levels (Garrod and Pickering, 2009; Pickering and Garrod, 2004), 
ranging from very low-level acoustic features such as speech rate (Webb, 1969) or accent 
(Giles and Powesland, 1975), to higher linguistic levels such as the lexical (Brennan and 
Clark, 1996) and syntactic (Branigan et al., 2000) levels, all with the ultimate goal to align 
extra-linguistic levels such as the representation of the situation under discussion (i.e. 
situation model). We hypothesize that the generative model entails all these levels, but 
interlocutors may be more or less aligned at different levels of the hierarchy. 
In line with this hypothesis, we predict that the level of representation on which 
listeners are aligned with their partner should be reflected in the spatial pattern of between-
brain neural coupling. For example, if listeners have aligned their representations with the 
speaker's at the syntactic level, this should minimally be reflected by neural coupling in 
cortical areas associated with syntactic processing. Although this hypothesis would definitely 
require further testing, there is one two-brain study that provides initial evidence. Above, 
based on the theoretical framework by Friston and Frith (Friston and Frith, 2015a; Friston and 
Frith 2015b), we hypothesized that speaker-listener neural coupling reflects alignment of their 
generative models, leading to similar predictions about upcoming information. A study by 
Dikker and colleagues (Dikker et al., 2014) measured brain activation (fMRI BOLD response) 
for one speaker and nine listeners. The speaker described pictures depicting events that could 
be described with a sentence containing a transitive verb. The lexical-semantic content of the 
speaker's sentences was classified as predictable or unpredictable, based on the degree to 
which the items in the depicted scene predicted for specific lexical choices. Predictability was 
assessed in a separate behavioral experiment. A picture was classified as highly predictable
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when there was high inter-speaker agreement (>85%) in the lexical-semantic content of the
sentences used to describe a picture (e.g. a penguin hugging a star: more than 85% of the
speakers described this scene with "the penguin is hugging the star"). For low-predictability
items, inter-speaker agreement was low (<35%, e.g. the guitar is boiling/cooking/stirring the
wheel/tire/bike). It is important to note that the predictability of syntactic structure did not
vary: the speaker always used simple declarative sentences. The speaker's descriptions were
then  presented  to  the  listeners.  Crucially,  Dikker  et  al.  report  stronger  speaker-listener
coupling for predictable relative to unpredictable descriptions in the left posterior superior
temporal  gyrus,  which is,  according to  them, associated with lexical-semantic  processing.
This study provides initial evidence that speaker-listener neural coupling is influenced by the
extent to which the listener is able to predict the speaker's utterance, as would be predicted by
our hypothesis. Furthermore, when manipulating predictability at the lexical-semantic level,
this leads to variations in coupling in brain areas associated with lexical-semantic processing. 
It would be very interesting if we could extend and test this idea to higher levels of
representational alignment. If  so,  between-brain neural coupling might be an interpersonal
neural marker for the ultimate goal of communication: mutual understanding, or alignment at
the level of the situation model. We will elaborate on this idea in section 4 below. 
4. Towards an inter-personal marker of mutual understanding?
An initial attempt to investigate the relationship between inter-subject correlations in brain
activity and mutual understanding was done by Stephens et al.  (Stephens et al.,  2010).  As
explained in section 2 of this paper, there was one speaker telling a story, and eleven listeners
who listened to that story in the MRI scanner. What was not mentioned in section 2 was that
after hearing the story, listeners were asked to retell the story that they heard with as much
detail as possible. Based on this retelling, Stephens et al. calculated for each listener to what
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extent  the  story told by  the  speaker  was successfully  communicated (i.e.  speaker-listener
alignment at the level of the situation model). Successful communication was thus defined as
the level of specificity with which listeners could retell the story. This measure was then used
as a factor to explain variance in the extent (i.e. the number of brain areas in which significant
coupling was found) that the listener’s brain activity reflected the speaker’s brain activity.
Stephens et al. found a positive relationship between their measure of communicative success
and the extent of speaker-listener between-brain coupling, which they argue to be evidence in
favor of the idea that between-brain neural coupling reflects alignment at  the level of the
situation model. 
However, it should be clear that this study cannot provide conclusive evidence that
variations in interpersonal correlations in brain activity reflect variations in alignment at the
level of the situation model.  Next to  the fact that a replication of these results  would be
warranted, one could question whether this design is best to address the question. If alignment
at the level of the situation model is reflected in between-brain neural coupling, we would
expect that this type of alignment is independent of the communicative signal. The design
used by Stephens et al. does not disentangle neural coupling due to alignment at low levels of
linguistic processing, which would depend on the actual communicative signal, from higher,
abstract levels at  the level of the situation model. Indeed,  the same communicative intent
could be signaled in many different ways. To extract between-brain coupling due to alignment
at  the  level  of  situation  models,  one  might  compare  between-brain  coupling for  speaker-
listener pairs in which the speakers always convey the same communicative intent (e.g. they
want to describe an event), but vary in the way they describe that event.
An additional important problem with the study by Stephens and colleagues is that
listeners were asked to retell the story that they had just heard. This assumes that alignment of
generative  models  is  a  static  end-state  of  a  communicative  process.  However,  in  their
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theoretical framework, Friston and Frith assume that the generative model driving predictions,
and  therefore  between-brain  coupling,  is  dynamic  and  changes  over  the  course  of  the
interaction. A similar idea has been proposed by Stolk and colleagues (Stolk et al., 2016). In
their  conceptual  alignment framework,  they  argue  that  as  the  interaction  unfolds,
communicators continuously update their conceptual spaces (the conceptualization of which
we believe to be similar to our earlier conceptualization of a generative model at the level of
the situation model).  Based on this idea,  they predict  that not only should producing and
interpreting  a  communicative  signal  lead  to  inter-communicator  between-brain  neural
coupling,  the  temporal  dynamics  of  this  shared  pattern  of  neural  activity  should  reflect
communicators'  adjustments of their shared conceptual spaces (i.e. situation model), which
would be crucial for mutual understanding. 
Interestingly, they provide support for this hypothesis in a non-verbal communicative
hyperscanning fMRI experiment (Stolk et al., 2014). In this experiment, participant pairs were
presented  with  novel  and  known  communicative  problems.  Crucially,  for  the  novel
communicative problems, there was no previously established solution: participants had to
coordinate  and mutually  adjust  their  situation  models  or  conceptual  spaces.  Interestingly,
Stolk et al. report stronger between-brain neural coupling (in right superior temporal gyrus)
when  both  participants  had  to  adjust  their  situation  model  relative  to  when  no  such
adjustments were necessary. Although Stolk et al. made use of a non-verbal communication
paradigm, this may be extended to a verbal communication paradigm in which interlocutors
do or do not have to mutually adjust their generative model.  
When thinking about between-brain neural coupling as a potential marker for mutual
understanding, mutual understanding should not be conceptualized as a static end-state that is
the result of successful communication. Rather, it has been argued that speaker-listener neural
coupling reflects a continuous process of between-participant alignment of their generative
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models (Friston and Frith, 2015a; Friston and Frith, 2015b; Stolk et al., 2016), which, in turn,
would be crucial for communication to be successful. 
5. Discussion
Recently,  it  has  been  argued  that  to  study  the  neural  basis  of  social  interaction,  which
necessarily  only  exists  between  individuals,  one  should  not  study within-individual  brain
activity but instead focus on the dynamical interplay between the brains of individuals in
interaction. Although this idea is intuitively appealing, it remains unclear what we can learn
from such a  two-brain  approach to  interaction:  what  is  reflected in  between-brain  neural
coupling? In the  current  paper,  we zoomed in on the questions that  can be addressed by
applying the two-brain approach to the study of the neural basis of verbal communication,
linking theoretically-motivated frameworks to testable hypotheses and existing empirical data.
In section 2, we discussed how the hyperscanning method has been used to identify
brain  networks  that  are  associated  with  language  production  as  well  as  language
comprehension. Indeed, if activity in area X in the brain of the sender is temporally correlated
with activity in area X in the brain of the listener, this indicates that area X is associated with
encoding as well as decoding of information. Although most (verbal) communication studies
have applied this reasoning to study the neural correlates of information transfer, we argued
that by focusing on what areas show consistent coupling across all speaker-listener pairs, we
ignore possibly valuable information that is represented in between-pair variation at the level
of  between-brain  neural  coupling.  Therefore,  in  section  3,  we  discussed  a  theoretical
framework (Friston and Frith, 2015a; Friston and Frith, 2015b) and formulated the hypothesis
that the level of between-brain alignment depends on how aligned listeners are with a speaker,
at different levels of linguistic and extra-linguistic representation. This hypothesis led to the
intuitively appealing idea that between-brain neural coupling could be an inter-personal neural
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marker for the highest level of alignment: alignment at the level of the situation model, or
mutual understanding. In section 4, we argued that to address this question, alignment at this
level should not be conceptualized as a static end-state of communication, but rather as a
dynamic and continuous process,  which may indeed be  reflected in  between-brain  neural
coupling.  
Before concluding, there is one last issue we want to address. Almost all two-brain
studies on verbal communication that have been discussed so far in this paper have considered
communication as a unidirectional process which can be described as transferring information
from  speaker  to  listener.  In  line  with  this  idea,  experimental  paradigms  include  two
participants, where one is always the speaker (or sender) and one is always the listener (or
receiver). In other words, the set-up resembles a monologue (i.e. giving a speech or a lecture)
rather than a dialogue, in which participants take turns speaking and listening. Whereas the
monologue set-up suffices to investigate whether there is a shared neural circuitry underlying
language production and comprehension,  it  is  not  the  ideal  set-up to  study inter-personal
neural  markers  of  between-subject  alignment.  Indeed,  we  need  to  consider  the  fact  that
alignment of situation models is often the result  of a joint process:  interlocutors build up
meaning  together.  The  Interactive  Alignment  theory  (Pickering  and  Garrod,  2004),  for
example, suggests that alignment of situation models is facilitated when interlocutors' align
their  behavioral  output  (e.g.  on  the  lexical  or  syntactic  level).  If  between-brain  neural
coupling is associated with alignment of situation models,  an interesting question may be
whether aligning behavior results in stronger neural coupling between interlocutors. Initial
evidence that supports this idea comes from a study by Jiang et al.  (Jiang et al., 2012), who
actually  did  include  a  dialogue  condition  in  their  two-brain  study.  Using  fNIRS
hyperscanning, Jiang et al. investigated neural coupling between interlocutors in dialogue and
monologue contexts. They found a significant increase in between-brain coupling in the left
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inferior frontal cortex for face-to-face dialogue, but not for monologue, and attribute their
result  to  the  fact  that  in  face-to-face dialogue,  there  was alignment  on different  levels of
(verbal) behavior and turn-taking, which was not the case for monologue. Although the study
by  Jiang  et  al.  was  not  designed  to  test  theoretically-driven,  causal  predictions  like  the
predictions proposed in  this  paper,  at  the  very  least,  their  study proves  the  feasibility  of
measuring  between-brain  neural  coupling  in  an  interactive,  bidirectional  setting  which
resembles natural interaction in dialogue. Together with the causal predictions that have been
formulated in the current paper,  we argue that the time has come to move to a two-brain
approach  of  verbal  interaction,  rather  than  a  two-brain  approach  of  one-way  verbal
communication. 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the question: what can we learn from a two-brain approach 
to verbal communication? Although the idea is intuitively appealing, to date, there has been a 
severe  lack  of  theoretically-driven  hypotheses  about  what  between-brain  neural  coupling 
actually reflects. We believe that such hypotheses are necessary for the field to move forward. 
By linking theoretically-motivated frameworks to existing empirical data, we have identified 
testable hypotheses that may be explored in future research. 
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